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Individuals in free societies frequently exhibit striking coordination when making independent
decisions en masse. Examples include the regular appearance of hit products or memes with sub-
stantially higher popularity compared to their otherwise equivalent competitors, or extreme polar-
ization in public opinion. Such segregation of events manifests as bimodality in the distribution
of collective choices. Here we quantify how apparently independent choices made by individuals
result in a significantly polarized but stable distribution of success in the context of the box-office
performance of movies and show that it is an emergent feature of a system of non-interacting agents
who respond to sequentially arriving signals. The aggregate response exhibits extreme variability
amplifying much smaller differences in individual cost of adoption. Due to self-organization of the
competitive landscape, most events elicit only a muted response but a few stimulate widespread
adoption, emerging as “hits”.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge,05.65.+b,64.60.-i,89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex systems often exhibit nontrivial patterns in
the collective (macro) behavior arising from the individ-
ual (micro) actions of many agents [1, 2]. Despite the
high degree of variability in the characteristics of the
individuals comprising a group, it is sometimes possi-
ble to observe robust empirical regularities in the system
properties [3–5]. The existence of inequality in individual
success, often measured by wealth or popularity, is one
such universal feature [6]. While agents differ in terms of
individual attributes, these can only partly explain the
degree of this inequality [7]. The outcomes often have
a heavy-tailed distribution with a much higher range of
variability than that observed in the intrinsic qualities.
Apart from the well-known Pareto law for income (or
wealth) [8, 9], other examples include distributions of
popularity for books [10], electoral candidates [11], on-
line content [12], and scientific paradigms [13].
Another form of inequality may be observed in dis-
tribution of outcomes having a strongly bimodal charac-
ter. Here events are clearly segregated into two distinct
classes, e.g., corresponding to successes and failures, re-
spectively. While such distributions have been reported
in many different contexts, e.g., gene expression [14],
species abundance [15, 16], wealth of nations [17], elec-
toral outcomes [18, 19], etc., one of the most robust
demonstrations of bimodality is seen in the distribution
of movie box-office success [20]. Here success is measured
in terms of either the gross income GO at the opening
weekend or the total grossGT calculated over the lifetime
(i.e., the entire duration that a movie is shown) at the-
aters. Fig. 1 (a-b) shows that both of these distributions
constructed from publicly available data for movies re-
leased in USA during the period 1997-2012 are described
well by a mixture of two log-normal distributions. Al-
though the movie industry has changed considerably dur-
ing this time, the characteristic properties of the distri-
butions appear to remain invariant over the successive
intervals comprising the period. The log-normal charac-
ter can be explained by the probability of movie success
being a product of many independent chance factors [21],
and is indeed observed in the unimodal distribution of
opening income per theater gO [Fig. 1 (c)]. However,
the clear distinction of movies into two classes in terms
of their box-office performance (as indicated by the oc-
currence of two modes in the GO and GT distributions)
does not appear to be simply related to their intrinsic
attributes [22]. The fact that bimodality is manifested
at the very beginning of a movie’s life also suggests that
the extreme divergence of outcomes cannot be fully at-
tributed to social learning occurring over time as a result
of diffusion of information about movie quality [23] (e.g.,
by word-of-mouth [24]). We also emphasize that the bi-
modal behavior is extremely robust and existed even be-
fore the advent of social media, which plays a major role
in word-of-mouth dynamics [25]. Thus, while there have
been theoretical attempts to explain the emergence of
bimodality by assuming specific forms of interactions be-
tween agents [26], it is of interest to see if bimodal popu-
larity distributions can arise without explicit agent-agent
interactions.
In this paper, we present a model for understanding
the collective response of a system of agents to successive
external shocks, where the behavior of each agent is the
result of a decision process independent of other agents.
Even in the absence of explicit interaction among agents,
the system can exhibit remarkable coordination, charac-
terized by the appearance of a strong bimodality in its
response. For the specific example of box-office success,
the bimodal nature of the gross income distributions ap-
pears to be connected to the fact that movies usually
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FIG. 1: (color online). Empirical demonstration of bimodal-
ity in movie popularity measured in terms of (a) opening in-
come GO and (b) total lifetime income GT of movies in the-
aters over successive intervals from 1997-2012 (indicated by
different symbols). The data are fit by superposition of two
log-normal distributions (broken curve). The cumulative dis-
tribution of the opening income per theater gO = GO/NO
over the same period is shown in (c). A fit with log-normal
distribution is also indicated (broken curve). (d) The bimodal
character of (a) and (b) can be connected to the bimodality
observed in the distribution of the number of opening theaters
NO (i.e., the total number of theaters in which a new movie
is released). The inset shows the distribution of exponents β
characterizing the power-law decay of the weekly income per
theater (gt ∼ gO t
β) for all movies. Note that all logarithms
are to base e.
open in either many or very few theaters. Therefore, we
focus on explaining the appearance of a bimodal distri-
bution for the number of theaters NO in which movies
open [Fig. 1 (d)]. Similar to how the observed invari-
ant properties of financial markets can be reproduced by
agents interacting indirectly through their response to a
common signal (price) [27], our model comprises agents
(theaters) that do not explicitly interact with each other
but whose actions achieve coherence by the regular ar-
rival of a global stimulus, viz., new movies being intro-
duced in the market. By contrast, decoherence is induced
by the uncertainty under which each agent independently
makes a decision on whether to switch to exhibiting the
new movie or not. We show that these competing effects
can result in the appearance of bimodality in the dis-
tributions of NO, and consequently, GO and GT , where
the success of a particular movie cannot be simply con-
nected to its perceived quality prior to release nor to its
actual performance on opening. Under a suitable ap-
proximation, we have analytically solved the model and
obtained closed form expressions for the peaks of the re-
sulting multimodal distribution that match our numeri-
cal results. An important implication of our study is that
the box-office performance of a movie is crucially depen-
dent on whether it is released close in time to a highly
successful one, which supports the popular wisdom that
correctly timing the opening of a movie determines its
fate at box-office.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we discuss the empirical data on movie income and
its analysis in detail, while the model is introduced in
Sec. III. Section IV describes the results, where we also
show the robustness of the bimodality obtained by look-
ing at several variants of the basic model. In addition,
we provide an analytical explanation for the emergence of
bimodality in the model. We conclude with a discussion
of the implications of our findings in Sec. V.
II. DATA ANALYZED
Data description. Income distributions are computed
from publicly available data (obtained from The Movie
Times website [28]) on box-office performance of movies
released in the United States of America over a span
of 16 years (1997-2012). Gross income over all theaters
within the USA are considered and the data are inflation-
adjusted with respect to 2010 as base year. To determine
the time-invariance of the nature of income distribution,
the total time period has been divided into four intervals,
viz., 1997-2000, 2001-2004, 2005-2008, and 2009-2012.
The total number of movies for which opening weekend
gross income GO data is available in each of these inter-
vals is 673, 1240, 1444, and 1226, respectively, while total
income GT (i.e., box-office receipts over the entire period
that a movie was shown in theaters) is available for 1160,
1240, 1444, and 1226 movies in each of these intervals,
respectively. Note that, a movie is associated with the
calendar year in which it was released in theaters within
the USA. Time-series of box-office income has been ob-
tained from The Movie Times site [28] for a total of 4568
movies over the period July 1998 to July 2012. To ob-
tain opening weekend income per theater gO, the gross
opening income GO is divided by the number of movie
theaters NO in which the movie is released in its opening
week.
Fitting procedures and statistical tests. The aggregate
variables NO, GO, and GT are fit with bimodal log-
normal distributions, i.e., a mixture of two log-normal
distributions with parameters µ1, σ1 and µ2, σ2, that
TABLE I: Values of log-normal distribution parameters for
different aggregate variables in the empirical data estimated
by maximum likelihood procedure.
Variable Distribution type α µ1 µ2 σ1 σ2
NO Bimodal 0.61 2.91 7.84 1.72 0.29
GO Bimodal 0.57 11.36 16.49 1.24 0.94
GT Bimodal 0.54 13.16 17.55 1.80 1.05
gO Unimodal 8.72 1.02
Nmax Bimodal 0.61 4.01 7.83 1.71 0.27
3are weighted by factors α and 1 − α, respectively. The
unimodal distribution of opening income per theater,
gO, has been fit with a log-normal distribution having
parameters µ and σ. The maximum likelihood estimates
(MLE) of the parameters for the empirical distributions
of NO, GO, GT , and gO are shown in Table I. Hartigan’s
dip test [29] for multimodality has been performed on
the data for NO, GO, and GT and unimodality is rejected
at 5% significance level. By contrast, unimodality for
the distribution of gO is not rejected by the test. The
time-series of movie income, gt, has been fit to the
general form gt ∼ gOt
β by a regression procedure carried
out over all movies that were shown in theaters for at
least 5 weeks.
Robustness of empirical features. To see whether the
qualitative features of the results of empirical analysis
are robust, we have also looked at variables other than
NO, GO, GT and gO. For example, if we consider in-
stead of the opening number of theaters NO, the largest
number of theaters Nmax that a movie is shown simulta-
neously at any time following its release, its distribution
also shows a bimodal nature and can be fit by a super-
position of two log-normal distributions Also, instead of
considering only the opening income per theater gO, we
have looked at the distribution of income per theater of
a movie at any given week following its release which is
seen to be qualitatively similar to gO and can be fit by a
unimodal log-normal distribution.
III. THE MODEL
We consider a system comprising N agents (theaters
or theater chains) subjected to external stimuli (entry
of new movies into the market), that have to choose a
response, i.e., whether or not to adopt a new movie,
displacing the one being shown. At any time instant
t, this decision depends on a comparison between the
perceived performance of the new movie and the actual
performance of the movie being shown at the theater
[Fig. 2 (a)]. For simplicity, we assume that a single new
movie is up for release at each time instant t, thus al-
lowing each movie to be identified by the corresponding
value of t. Allowing multiple movies to be released to-
gether does not qualitatively change the results. The
state of a theater at any time is indicated by the identity
of the movie it screens at that time [Fig. 2 (b)]. The per-
formance of a movie t′ at time t can be quantified by the
estimated income per theater, gt, which is related to its
opening value gt
′
O by a scaling relation g
t = gt
′
O(t − t
′)βs .
This relation is partly inspired by the empirical observa-
tion [Fig. 1 (d), inset] that the weekly income per theater
for a movie decays as a power law function of the num-
ber of weeks after its release, characterized by exponent
β [20]. One can also interpret βs as a subjective discount
factor employed by the agents to estimate the future in-
come of a movie based on its present income. For simplic-
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FIG. 2: (color online). (a) Schematic diagram of the stochas-
tic decision process of agents (theaters i, j and k) who can
either continue with “old” (movie being shown) or switch to
“new” (movie up for release) at any time instant t. The prob-
ability that an agent i will adopt the new movie, pi,t, depends
on a comparison of the perceived performance of that movie,
θt, to the actual performance of the movie being shown (which
is related to its opening income g0,i). (b) Time-evolution of a
system comprising N = 50 agents (theaters), the state of each
agent at any time being the movie (colored according to the
time of release) that it is showing. At every time instant, a
new movie is available for release. The variable performance
of these movies are indicated in terms of the number of the-
aters where they open (NO) and their opening income (GO).
ity, most results presented here are for βs = 0. We also
show that other choices of βs yield qualitatively similar
results. Note that the model does not assume any com-
petition for audience between theaters showing the same
movie (i.e., the demand is perfectly inelastic in terms of
theaters) as the empirical data suggests that the income
per theater of a movie is relatively independent of the
number of theaters in which it opens.
Information available to agents. As agents are exposed
to similar information about a movie that is up for re-
lease, they can have a common perception about its per-
formance, measured as its predicted opening income per
theater, θt. This is chosen at each time step from a
distribution that is identical to that of gtO. In fact, if
the agents had perfect foresight, this prediction would
be identical to the actual opening income of the movie
gtO, which would have resulted in either a movie releasing
in all theaters or not being released in any theater. In
general, however, predictions are rarely accurate [30] and
the results shown here are obtained for the case when the
predicted income θt is independent of the realized income
gtO. We later show that the qualitative behavior of the
model is unchanged even when θt is correlated with g
t
O.
Dynamics of the adoption process. At any time t, an
agent i switches to the new movie if it decides that this
move will result in a sufficiently high net gain zt(i) =
4θt − g
t(i), measured as the difference between the pre-
dicted income of the new movie up for release and the
income of the currently running movie. As θt is log-
normally distributed with the µ and σ of gO estimated
from empirical data (see Table I), we normalize zt(i) by
the mean of the distribution, viz. exp(µ+σ2/2). The ac-
tion of switching (or not) is implemented by representing
the probability of adopting the new movie as a hyperbolic
response function [31] for positive net gain zt(i):
pi,t[zt(i)] =
{
zt(i)
C+zt(i)
for zt(i) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise,
(1)
where parameter C is the cost of adoption, incurred due
to switching to a new movie. Such a functional form
allows us to model probabilistic decision making under
uncertainty by the agents. At the limit of extremely low
adoption cost, i.e., C → 0, we recover a more determinis-
tic switching behavior from Eq. (1), with the probability
of adoption behaving as a step function as it changes
from 0 to 1 around z = 0. Eq. (1) allows us to calcu-
late the number of opening theaters NO for every new
movie [Fig. 2 (b)]. To obtain the opening income GO of
the movie over all theaters that release it, NO is multi-
plied with the opening income per theater that is chosen
from the log-normal distribution of gO referred to ear-
lier [Fig. 1 (c)]. The subsequent decay of income per
theater follows the empirical scaling relation with expo-
nent β [20]. The total lifetime income of a movie GT is
obtained by aggregating this income for all theaters it
is shown in, over the entire lifespan (i.e., from the time
it is released until it is displaced from all theaters). The
first few hundred time steps of each simulation realization
were considered to be transients and removed to avoid
initial state dependent effects.
IV. RESULTS
Reproducing the bimodal distribution of movie income.
As seen from Fig. 3, the system of N independent agents
self-organize in the limit of low C to generate a bimodal
distribution in their collective response. A new movie is
either adopted by a majority [corresponding to the up-
per mode of the NO distribution shown in Fig. 3 (a)]
or a small fraction [lower mode] of the total number of
theaters. This translates into bimodal distributions in
the opening income GO and total lifetime income GT
[Fig. 3 (b-c)], which qualitatively resemble the corre-
sponding empirically obtained distributions (Fig. 1). To
emphasize that bimodality in total income GT is a conse-
quence of the bimodal nature of the opening income, we
show GT as a function of the lifetime T in Fig. 3 (d). We
observe a bifurcation in GT at higher values of T indicat-
ing that movies having the same lifetime can have very
different total income, a feature that is seen in empirical
data [Fig. 4 (a-b), see also Ref. [32]]. Thus, our results
suggest that the nature of box-office income distributions
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FIG. 3: (color online). A bimodal distribution emerges from
independent decisions of N agents (theaters). Transition be-
tween bimodality and unimodality with parametric variation
of the cost of adoption C is shown for the distributions of
(a) the number of opening theaters NO , (b) opening income
GO and (c) total lifetime income GT of movies. The results
are obtained by averaging over 60 realizations with N = 3000
agents. (d) The total income GT earned by a movie as a func-
tion of its lifetime T , i.e., the duration of its run at theaters,
shows that for higher values of T , the movies separate into
two classes (C = 10−4).
for movies can be understood as an outcome of the bi-
modal character of the distribution for the number of
theaters that release a movie coupled with the unimodal
log-normal distribution for the income per theater.
A verification of our model results with empirical data
is provided by a comparison of the corresponding dis-
tributions of the lifetime of movies, i.e., the duration of
their run in theaters. Fig. 4 (c-d) shows that the two
distributions are qualitatively similar. The shape of the
lifetime distribution for the model can be varied to an
extent by changing the cost of adoption C and the sub-
jective discount factor βs.
Transition to unimodality with increasing adoption cost.
As the cost of adoption C is increased, the two modes
approach each other until, at a large enough value of
C, a transition to unimodal distribution for the quanti-
ties is observed [Fig. 3 (a-c)]. With increasing C, the-
aters are less likely to switch to a new movie, so that the
time-interval between two consecutive movie releases at
a theater becomes extremely long. This weakens tempo-
ral correlations between the performance of movies being
shown and that expected from new movies up for release.
Thus, the decision to release each new movie eventually
becomes an independent stochastic event described by an
unimodal distribution.
Robustness of bimodality. For most simulations, we have
chosen N = 3000, which accords with the maximum
number of theaters in the empirical data. However, to
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FIG. 4: (color online). (a) Total lifetime income GT of movies
released during 2000-2008 shown as a function of the number
of weeks T that they were shown in theaters. (b) The aver-
age total gross 〈GT 〉 corresponding to each value of T . At
large values of T , we observe a divergence corresponding to
a separation of the movies into two classes. (c) Complemen-
tary cumulative distribution of the lifetime T of movies, i.e.,
the duration of their run in theaters, for movies released dur-
ing 2000-2012. (d) The corresponding distribution generated
by the model system for N = 3000 agents (theaters), cost of
adoption C = 1, and subjective discount factor βs = −0.6.
Note that the shape of the distribution obtained from the
model can be varied to an extent by changing the parameters
C (that shifts the distribution along the horizontal axis) and
βs (which alters the slope).
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FIG. 5: (color online). Robustness of the model results with
respect to variation in system size N , viz., increasing the num-
ber of agents to N = 106. The results are obtained by sim-
ulating the system with cost of adoption C = 10−4 for 500
iterations and averaging over 60 realizations. The bimodal
nature of the distributions of (a) the number of opening the-
aters NO and (b) opening income GO of movies is evident.
verify that our results are not sensitively system-size de-
pendent, we have checked that qualitatively similar be-
havior is observed for N up to 106 (Fig. 5).
While for most results reported here the subjective dis-
count factor βs = 0, we have verified that the results are
qualitatively unchanged if βs has a value different from 0.
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FIG. 6: (color online). Robustness of the model results with
respect to a different choice of the subjective discount factor,
viz., βs = −1. While the peaks at the lower value are smaller
than the case of βs = 0 for both (a) the number of opening
theaters NO and (b) opening income GO, it can be observed
that as the cost of adoption, C, is decreased, the nature of
the distribution changes from unimodal to bimodal. Results
are shown for N =3000 agents for 104 iterations and averaged
over 60 realizations.
FIG. 7: (color online). The time-evolution of the income per
theater g of four movies that were released in theaters at
various times during the period investigated here. The decay
of gt with t approximately fits a power-law form. The broken
line corresponding to gt ∼ t
−1 is shown for visual reference.
Fig. 6 shows that even if βs = −1, a transition from uni-
modality to bimodality occurs as seen earlier for βs = 0,
when the cost of adoption C is decreased.
The empirical data shows that the income per theater
of all movies decay with time having an approximately
power-law form gt ∼ gOt
β (Fig. 7). The value of the ex-
ponent β ≈ −1 on average (corresponding to the broken
line in Fig. 7), which governs how the income per theater
changes over time. This motivated our choice of β = −1
in the basic model. Instead of all movies having exactly
identical form of decay in the time-evolution of their in-
come per theater as in the basic model, we can consider
that different movies are characterized by different values
of the exponent β. In particular, we choose the values
of β from a distribution that approximates the empiri-
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FIG. 8: (color online). Robustness of the model results with
respect to heterogeneity in the nature of the temporal de-
cay of the income per theater of different movies, viz., their
decay exponents β being distributed approximately as the
corresponding empirical distribution shown in Fig. 1 (d, in-
set). Transition between bimodality and unimodality with
parametric variation of the cost of adoption C is shown for
the distributions of (a) the number of opening theaters NO ,
(b) opening income GO and (c) total lifetime income GT of
movies. The results are obtained by simulating a system with
N = 3000 agents for 104 iterations and averaging over 60
realizations. The distribution of β for different movies for a
particular simulation realization is shown in (d). The values
are generated from a normal distribution with the same mean
(µ = −1) and standard deviation (σ = 0.33) as the empirical
distribution of β.
cal distribution of β shown in Fig. 1 (d, inset). Fig. 8
shows that the results of the simulations of this variant
model are qualitatively similar to that of the basic model,
including the transition from unimodality to bimodality.
We have also verified that considering income aggre-
gated over successive periods (instead of only the opening
income) do not qualitatively change the results reported
here. The model also shows very similar behavior if, in-
stead of Eq. (1), we use other more complicated func-
tional forms for the probabilistic choice functions, e.g.,
pi,t =
1
2
+
zt(i)
2
√
C + zt(i)2
, (2)
which has a sigmoidal profile (Fig. 9). In addition,
we have considered a variant model where the agents
can make perfect prediction about the performance of
a movie up for release so that θt = g
t
O. Results are qual-
itatively similar to the basic model and bimodality is see
over a range of values of the cost parameter C (Fig. 10).
Analytical explanation of the emergence of bimodality. To
understand the appearance of multiple peaks in the dis-
tribution of collective response in the limit of low cost of
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FIG. 9: (color online). Robustness of the model results with
respect to use of a different functional form for the adoption
rule, viz., having a sigmoidal character. Transition between
bimodality and unimodality with parametric variation of the
cost of adoption C is shown for the distributions of (a) the
number of opening theaters NO and (b) opening income GO ,
when Eqn. (2) is used for the functional form representing
the probability of adopting the new movie. The results are
obtained by simulating a system with N = 3000 agents for
104 iterations and averaging over 60 realizations.
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FIG. 10: (color online). Robustness of the model results when
the agents (theaters) can exactly predict their income from a
new movie up for release, i.e., θ = gO. The distributions of (a)
the number of opening theaters NO and (b) opening income
GO are unimodal when the cost of adoption C is low, as in
this situation, a movie will either be adopted by all theaters
or none at all. With increasing C, a distinct bimodal nature
emerges in the distributions. Results are shown for N =3000
agents for 104 iterations and averaged over 60 realizations.
adoption, we observe that the system dynamics is char-
acterized by two competing effects: (a) the stochastic de-
cision process of the individual theaters tend to increas-
ingly decorrelate their states, while (b) the occasional ap-
pearance of movies having high θ, that are perceived by
the agents to be potential box-office successes, induces
high level of coordination in response as a majority of
agents switches to a common state. This phenomenon
of gradual divergence in agent states interrupted by spo-
radic “reset” events that largely synchronize the system
allows us to use the following simplification of the model
for an analytical explanation. As C → 0, we can approxi-
mate Eq. (1) by pi,t = p for zt(i) ≥ 0, else pi,t = 0, which
becomes accurate in the limit p → 1. Thus, when a re-
set event occurs, the decision of each agent is a Bernoulli
trial with probability p, so that the number of theaters
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FIG. 11: (color online). Explaining the emergence of bimodal
distribution in the limit of small cost of adoption (C → 0).
The appearance of bimodality with parametric variation of
the probability of adoption p is shown for the distributions
of (a) the number of opening theaters NO and (b) opening
income GO . As p → 1, the approximation to the C → 0
limit becomes more accurate. The results are obtained by
averaging over 60 realizations with N = 3000 agents. The pair
of thick lines in each figure indicate the theoretically predicted
modes of the distributions (see text). (c-e) The variations of
opening income GO and total lifetime income GT of a movie
as functions of the perceived performance θ and the actual
performance (i.e., income per theater) gO shows that neither
θ nor gO completely determine GO or GT (p = 0.9995).
that adopt the new movie follows a binomial distribution
with mean Np and varianceNp(1−p). In the limit p→ 1
the variance becomes negligibly small and the distribu-
tion can be effectively replaced by its mean. This will
correspond to a peak at NuO = Np, i.e., the higher mode.
A movie that immediately follows a reset event can re-
sult in different responses from the agents depending on
the value of θ associated with it. If this is larger than
gt of all theaters, it is yet another reset event, the re-
sponse to which is the same as above. However, if θ has
a lower value that is nevertheless large enough to cause
those theaters [≃ N(1− p)] that had not switched in the
previous reset event to adopt the new movie with prob-
ability p, we obtain another peak at N lO = Np(1 − p).
This corresponds to the lower mode of the distribution.
As seen from Fig. 11 (a), the two peaks of NO distri-
bution are accurately reproduced by NuO and N
l
O. In
principle, the above argument can be extended to show
that a series of peaks at successively smaller values of
NO can exist at Np(1 − p)
2, Np(1 − p)3, etc., but these
will not be observed for the system size we consider here.
The bimodal log-normal distribution of opening income
GO results from a convolution of the multi-peaked dis-
tribution for NO with the log-normal distribution for gO
(having parameters µ, σ). The two modes of this distri-
bution are calculated as Gu,lO = exp(µ+ logN
u,l
O ), which
matches remarkably well with the numerical simulations
of the model [Fig. 11 (b)].
While the individual behavior of agents are obviously
dependent on the intrinsic properties (such as θ) associ-
ated with specific stimuli, the collective behavior of the
system cannot be reduced to a simple threshold-like re-
sponse to external signals. Fig. 11 (c) shows that the
opening income of different movies, which are segregated
into two distinct clusters, are not simply determined by
their perceived performance θ, as one can find movies
belonging to either cluster for any value of this quantity.
Given that θ is only a prediction of the opening perfor-
mance of a movie by the agents, and it need not coincide
with reality, one may argue that the actual performance,
i.e., the opening income per theater gO, will be the key
factor determining the aggregate income of the movie.
However, Fig. 11 (d-e) show that neither the opening in-
come nor the total lifetime income (both of which show
clear separation into two clusters) can be explained as a
simple function of the actual opening performance of the
movie at a theater.
V. DISCUSSION
Our results explain box-office success as an outcome of
competition between movies, where a new movie seeks to
open at as many theaters as possible by displacing the
older ones. Using an ecological analogy, a movie with
high perceived performance invades and occupies a large
number of niches until it is displaced later by a strong
competitor. Thus, highly successful movies rarely coex-
ist. This also implies that the response to a movie can be
very different depending on whether or not it is released
close to a reset event, i.e., the appearance of a highly
successful movie (“blockbuster”). Therefore, our model
provides explicit theoretical support to popular wisdom
that timing the release of a movie correctly is a key de-
terminant of its success at the box-office [33].
We also note that the knowledge of the time elapsed
from the last blockbuster may not by itself lead to a
successful strategy for optimally timing the release of a
movie. If the entry of a new movie is delayed to in-
crease the time interval from the previous reset event
so as to increase its chance of doing well at the box of-
fice, a competing movie released before it may become
a “hit” and thereby prevent its success. Thus, there is
a trade-off between waiting for as long as possible after
the last successful movie but not so long as to get beaten
by a competitor. The critical importance of the launch
time holds not only for movies, but also for many other
short life-cycle products such as music, video games, etc.,
whose opening revenues very often decide their eventual
sales [34]. In fact, empirical data on movies show that for
the dominant majority, the highest gross earning over all
theaters they are shown in occurs on the opening week-
end, followed by an exponential decay in income [20]. In
extremely few cases does a movie become more successful
8over time with its income exhibiting an increasing trend,
eventually reaching a peak before again declining expo-
nentially. To explain such rare “sleeper hits” [e.g., the
movie My Big Fat Greek Wedding (2002) that achieved
its highest gross around 20 weeks after its release], one
may need to consider how agents can directly influence
each other. This suggests that models for generating bi-
modal distributions that incorporate explicit interactions
between agents such as in Ref. [26] could complement the
one presented here where an effective external field guides
the actions of the agents who otherwise do not commu-
nicate.
To conclude, we have shown that extreme variability
in response, characterized by a bimodal distribution, can
arise in a system even in the absence of explicit interac-
tions between its components. The observed inequality
of outcomes cannot be explained solely on the basis of
variations in the intrinsic quality of signals driving the
system. For a quantitative validation of the model we
have used the explicit example of movie box-office perfor-
mance whose bimodal distribution has been established
empirically. The log-normal nature of the distribution of
income per theater suggests that the underlying mecha-
nism involves sequential stochastic processes. Our anal-
ysis reveals that stochastic decisions on the basis of com-
paring effects of the preceding choice and the estimated
impact of the upcoming one gives rise to a surprising de-
gree of coordination. The presence of bimodality in the
absence of explicit interactions in several social and bi-
ological systems suggests other possible applications of
the theoretical approach presented here. Apart from bi-
modality, our model shows that more general multimodal
distributions are possible in principle and empirical ver-
ification of this in natural and social systems will be an
exciting development.
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